Marifeli Perez-Stable

Published in The Miami Herald
March 2, 2007

After candidate Vicente Fox upended the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s electoral machinery in 2000, Mexican expectations soared. As president, however, Fox was cowed by the PRI state he inherited. With even minimal political skills, his administration might have advanced the reforms Mexico now needs more pressingly. His personality rather than his competence won him high approval ratings. Mexicans, in fact, thought him to be in over his head.

Even so, it was never going to be easy. Until the 1970s, the PRI — averse to competition in politics or economics — presided over strong economic growth and improved living standards. The private sector flourished under protectionist policies and generous subsidies. Under PRI tutelage, unions — leaders, especially — grew rich and powerful. Small businesses and rank-and-file workers tallied more modest gains. Always further behind was rural, indigenous Mexico, a fact that still grinds on the divide between the relatively prosperous north and the persistently poor south.

Only after the state-centered bubble burst in the early 1980s did the PRI (sort of) embrace competition. Mexico eventually joined NAFTA and enacted privatizations. In 1989, the National Action Party won the governorship of Baja California, a ground breaker after the 1988 election when the PRI had retained Los Pinos courtesy of an opportune computer breakdown. In fits and starts, Mexico’s opening continued during the 1990s. In 2000, the voto útil — a vote cast usefully to evict the PRI from the presidency — decided Fox’s victory.

In Calderón, Mexicans have a president who understands the national maze. Whether he can lead the country out of it is the central question. Without infusing competition into the economy, e.g., weakening oligopolies and modernizing unions, Mexico will not grow at the annual rate needed — at least, six percent — to create decent jobs and regain international competitiveness. Without greater accountability to ordinary citizens, the political system will remain a fiefdom of the political and economic elites.

While politics is the art of the possible, Calderón should push the envelope. The rising cost of tortillas aside, the lay of the land is somewhat favorable. With Beatriz Paredes as its president, the PRI could become the partner Calderón needs to pass major legislation.

While recalcitrant sectors of the Party of the Democratic Revolution refuse to accept last year’s electoral outcome, PRD governors and some legislators are ready to deal. Calderón, however, must put his own house in order: PAN president Manuel Espino has too often publicly undermined him.

Understandably, the tortilla crisis has cut into PAN’s approval ratings. Yet, the outlook isn’t bad. PAN is the party identification of nearly 26 percent of Mexicans, the typical range in the months leading up to the Calderón’s inauguration. The PRI holds about 20 percent, the PRD less than 15 percent. Though declining nine points in voter preference from December 2006 to January 2007, the PAN still musters over 31 percent, besting the PRI by 10 points and the PRD by 13.

Still, national polls show strong, favorable trends for the PAN. On a series of questions such as a party that cares about people like you, promotes economic growth, is law-abiding, provides good government and offers a better future, PAN advantages over the PRI and the PRD are considerable. Clearly, the PRI’s continuing discredit and the PRD’s eclipse are a boon to the PAN.

No silver bullet

Yet, Calderón needs to walk a tightrope. Finding common ground requires that the two main opposition parties also make gains. All must be able to deliver on agreements reached. Calderón, at the same time, must show his mettle as the prime architect of consensus, the man who can produce results that most everyone else can live with. Fortunately, the president is a lifelong politician.

There is no tomorrow regarding the reforms Mexico needs. What happens in this sexenio (six-year presidential period) will be decisive, for good or for ill. Let’s hope it’s the former.

At least, Calderón knows that there’s no silver bullet like the voto útil was for wresting the presidency from the PRI. It has been and will continue to be a hard slog.