Marifeli Perez-Stable

Published in The Miami Herald
July 30, 2009

I don’t know what else to call it. If a president is awakened by soldiers pointing their weapons in his face, what is it if not a coup? Still, Manuel Zelaya’s removal on June 28 can’t be treated as if it were a return to the 1970s when brutal coups established military governments, banned political parties and perpetrated massive human-rights violations.

Before his ouster, Zelaya was in a tug-of-war with Congress and the courts over the now frustrated referendum. No fourth ballot box will be installed in November’s general election asking voters whether or not to convene a constitutional assembly. Under the Honduran constitution, only the Supreme Electoral Tribunal can call a referendum.

In late May, the Administrative Law Tribunal ruled that the president lacked the authority to proceed. All the same, Zelaya barreled ahead. On June 25, he upbraided the Supreme Court, the political establishment and the oligarchy. The next afternoon the Supreme Court issued a unanimous order of arrest against Zelaya for his serial flaunting of the constitution.

The coup settled the tug-of-war between the executive and the other two branches. A few days later the military’s top legal advisor admitted that Zelaya’s deportation was illegal but considered it justified to avoid bloodshed. “If we had left him here, right now we would be burying a pile of people,” he concluded.

Negotiations hamstrung

Taking a narrow view of the Honduran crisis hamstrings negotiations. Focusing only on June 28 ignores what was happening before Zelaya’s toppling. While rightly condemning the coup, the international community did nothing before June 28 to denounce Zelaya’s power grab. Pretending that Roberto Micheletti’s ascendance amounted to a mere constitutional succession flies in the face of a pajama-clad Zelaya being whisked away by armed soldiers.

Honduran elites must come to terms with their responsibility in the larger picture. Manuel Torres, an analyst for El Inventario (inventariandoopiniones.blogspot.com/), noted that the political and business establishments had never done much to uphold the rule of law. Instead, these elites created a “patrimonial and clientelistic state, competent only in offering impunity while supervising a loss of no less than 800 billion lempiras ($42 billion) between 1982 and 2008.”

Would Honduras still be the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere if even half of those billions had been spent to improve the lives of the 70 percent who are poor? It’s true that Hugo Chávez supported Zelaya with oil, cash and advice. But he is not to blame for a self-absorbed establishment that sailed on as the great majority suffered the indignities of poverty.

Populist rhetoric

Zelaya’s referendum obsession belied his populist rhetoric. According to Honduran NGOs, he differed hardly at all from his predecessors in combating poverty, preferring direct subsidies — which generate quick political returns — to creating jobs, extending education and improving healthcare.

Lack of transparency and mushrooming political turmoil, moreover, undermined the confidence of the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Zelaya’s government. As Honduran creditworthiness declined, Chávez happily picked up the slack.

For the first time, the Chavista model — a fairly elected president who guts democracy from within and proceeds to govern autocratically — ran into a wall. That’s why Chávez and his allies are so outraged and why they will do their mightiest to prevent any compromise even if it means stoking an “insurrection.”

I’ll continue writing on Honduras in two weeks. For now, I’m torn about reinstating the deposed president — the right thing to do if we focus exclusively on June 28.

In principle, any negotiated solution should start with Zelaya finishing his term but only if he agrees not to take up where he left off.

Put on the pressure

What if he agrees but once back doesn’t keep his word? Would the international community hold his feet to the fire or would it nonchalantly go back to where it, too, had left off? Unless the world acknowledges the reality that the crisis didn’t start on June 28 and acts accordingly, I don’t see Zelaya being returned to power.

Nota Bene: Like other Central Americans, Hondurans trust the armed forces more than any other institution. Might the generals end up as mediators of the crisis?