Marifeli Perez-Stable

Published in The Miami Herald

September 2, 2004

Democracy produces winners and losers. By most accounts, Hugo Chávez easily deflected the opposition’s bid to recall him on Aug. 15. The Democratic Coordinator — a coalition of opposition groups — is, nonetheless, insisting that a ”gigantic fraud” was perpetrated.

Absent proof, the international community — the Bush administration included — has recognized Chávez’s victory. Barring unforeseen developments, that’s the deck of cards the opposition has been dealt. Fanning the claim of a rigged referendum will only dig the anti-Chavista leadership deeper into the hole.

There’s no gainsaying the opposition’s quagmire. In 1998, Chávez rose to the presidency on the back of Venezuela’s moribund political system. A new constitution, an avalanche of executive decrees, the takeover of most institutions and populist mobilizations quickly entrenched him in power. A tightening of the stranglehold may now follow.

Having bet the house on winning the referendum, the opposition is understandably despondent. The transparency of the Aug. 15 vote aside, Chávez has undoubtedly finessed the rules of the political game in his favor. While democratically elected and now ratified, he disdains pluralism and tramples on checks and balances. How, then, can the opposition win? Though there are no easy or evident answers, that’s precisely what renewed or new leaders must figure out. Unless there’s a gut-wrenching coming-to-terms with the road that led them where they are today, I’m afraid it won’t happen.

Venezuela’s polarization antedates Chávez. For a quarter century before 1998, anger and frustration burrowed deep into the body politic as the country recklessly wallowed in $300 billion of oil wealth. The few consumed as if tomorrow would inevitably bring more of the same, while the many stood on the outside looking in. Chávez opened the door, and the disinherited walked in, emboldened by their newly acquired sense of entitlement. Does the opposition truly grasp the depths of feelings that bind the poor to Chávez?

Most opponents unequivocally embrace liberal democracy. Unfortunately, the opposition still bears the stigma of the aborted coup of April 2002, which was propelled by a minority. Upon resuming power, Chávez sifted the military for disloyal officers. At the end of that year, a two-month old strike in the oil sector not only failed to unseat Chávez but also provided him with the opportunity to take control of the state oil agency. The opposition entered the referendum with two strikes and struck out when it did not pass muster at the polls. After every at bat, Chávez has come out stronger.

Chávez is Chávez: a populist demagogue who thrives on confrontation, grabs power at every occasion, is a supremely able communicator, gives handouts to the poor and has no sensible blueprint for economic development. In contrast, I can’t really come up with a succinct description of the opposition, and that’s part of the problem. If ordinary Venezuelans are similarly stumped, then the referendum outcome is less surprising. Indeed, many may well have voted No holding their noses.

What shouldn’t be in doubt is the significance of the 75-percent voter turnout on Aug. 15. I suspect that the more than 10 million citizens who voted did so hoping that — whatever the result — the referendum would bring a modicum of peace and reconciliation. If neither comes about, whom will the citizenry blame?

A good-faith national dialogue — that is, both sides listening honestly for the sake of partially bridging their differences — could ease the current impasse. Only if Chavista and opposition moderates gain the upper hand would such a dialogue have a chance. If radicals completely take over — by extending Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution full-speed or by the opposition withdrawing from the political process — Venezuela would be in for a long, abysmal night.

Were I Venezuelan, I would have registered an emphatic Yes in the referendum. Votes like mine, however, are never going to add up to an opposition victory. For that to happen, opponents must take hard, unsparing stock so that they can climb out of the hole, break new ground and leave Chávez with the short end of the democratic stick.