Marifeli Perez-Stable

Published in The Miami Herald

December 9, 2004

In the late 1970s, Adolfo Suárez — Spain’s first democratic president — emphasized Latin America’s special place in Spanish foreign policy. Initially, language, culture and history affirmed Spanish-Latin American ties; investments and diplomacy would later strengthen them. Looking toward 1992 — the 500th anniversary of the encounter between the Old and New Worlds — the conservative Suárez embraced the idea of an Iberoamerican community that also included Portugal and Brazil.

Special, however, did not mean priority. Under Suárez and, after 1982, Felipe González, Spain had two main foreign charges: joining Europe and redefining relations with the United States. Both were accomplished successfully: Spain entered NATO and the then-European Economic Community while maintaining close cooperation with Washington on defense. Latin America was always a supporting actor in the main theaters of Spanish foreign policy.

Still, supporting actors matter. Latin America is the main recipient of Spanish foreign aid. Only the United States surpasses Spain in investments and diplomatic missions in the region. Since 1991, Spain has been the main drive behind the yearly Iberoamerican summits — Suárez’s idea come to life — and will open an Iberoamerican permanent secretariat in Madrid next spring. That Enrique Iglesias — the widely respected outgoing president of the Inter-American Development Bank — is likely to lead the new organization bodes well for realizing a substantive agenda beyond the largely ceremonial summits.

Neoliberal reforms

In 1996, the Popular Party defeated the Socialists, and José María Aznar succeeded Felipe González. For the most part, the unequivocally conservative Aznar adhered to the foreign-policy consensus on alliances with Europe and the United States as well as relations with Latin America. While Aznar used harder rhetoric toward Cuba, Spanish investors derailed fundamental changes. Like the Clinton administration, the populares pedaled neoliberal reforms as the cure-all for Latin America’s problems. Unlike González, Aznar often assumed a tone of España potencia that rang of centuries long passed in Latin American ears.

Not until after 9/11 did Aznar’s foreign policy shift dramatically. Public opinion in Spain and most of Europe notwithstanding, the Spanish government fully aligned with the Bush administration on Iraq. What before 9/11 had been not so consequential twists regarding Latin America now became monumental.

Aznar brought undue pressure on Mexico and Chile to fall into line behind Washington at the United Nations’ Security Council, which neither did. In the war’s aftermath, Spain organized a joint Spanish, Central American and Dominican brigade to keep the peace and aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. Aznar, in short, was seen as doing Washington’s bidding when most in Latin America strongly disapproved of President Bush and his policies.

To be fair, there is a sector of Spanish public opinion that favors a stronger tilt toward the United States and Great Britain: In the European Union, Spain will always be second fiddle to Germany and France while, allied with Washington and London, España potencia gets a larger play in the field . Yet, the Popular Party lost on March 14, 2004 — for a confluence of reasons which the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11 only catalyzed — and now José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is Spain’s prime minister. Elections also matter, and the Socialists are steering Spanish foreign policy back to the tracks that most Spaniards have long supported. Regarding Latin America, Madrid is downplaying the idea of Spanish power and resuming that of Spain as part of the Iberoamerican community.

Excellent bridge

In that spirit, Zapatero has proposed a debt-reduction program to steer some resources used to service the debt toward investments in education. The Socialists are seeking a more-fluid interlocution between the European Union and the governments of Cuba and Venezuela. Zapatero is an excellent bridge with the center-left governments that have been or will be elected in Latin America.

Washington has no love lost for the new administration in Madrid. Yet Zapatero is as much a fact of life as a reelected Bush is. Spain under the Socialists could well be more helpful to the United States in Latin America than it was under Aznar’s populares. Both Washington and Madrid need to keep their eyes on the end in common — the defense of democracy and economic freedom — and agree to disagree on the means.