 V. 109 N. 4 Fall 1994

of strategic nonviolent conflict, which contribute to victory when correctly applied and which explain stalemate or defeat when they are ignored.

Having squarely addressed the problem that such analyses have in the past sometimes not acknowledged the reality of conflicts of interest, the authors stipulate at least two other problems, but they may not be as successful as they would like in responding to them:

First, as with the same kinds of principles developed by authors like Liddell Hart for violent warfare, there is a risk of tautology in the formulations offered. The causal linkages outlined may be unfalsifiable as the words are used, and the policy advice may be something that made sense automatically, or advice that we can not tell whether it has been applied until we see whether the struggle was successful. This is, of course, a problem with many books on ordinary military strategy, the very books that this work on nonviolent strategy seeks to imitate. In the end, this book makes the general case that wise policy can make the difference between defeat and victory, a difficult argument to refute.

Second, the authors are clearly trying to be less doctrinaire and more open minded than some earlier books on nonviolent approaches. Thus they make some motion toward conceding that something depends on the liberality of the regime against which such tactics are being applied and on the comparative resources of regimes vs. protesters in the endurance contest of strikes and sit-downs, etc. Yet in the end, the toughest case introduced is that of the Danes against the Nazis, which is rated a "success" mainly because the world was defeating Hitler elsewhere in Europe by violent means. Little mention is made of the Danes' comparative exemption (because they were blue-eyed Aryans) from the more normal Nazi violent responses to resistance. In short, there is still a tendency to treat nonviolent approaches here as a morally imperative absolute, rather than as a tactic appropriate only where it is effective. Thus the authors dodge discussing the cases where it would be least effective.

The authors are to be congratulated for having engaged the normal how-to-win debate as much as they do, for the book thus makes for interesting and provocative reading. Yet more would have to be offered in discussions of Rwanda and Bosnia as well as Poland and the Philippines, in discussions of Hitler's rule and Stalin's rule over Eastern Europe as well as Gorbachev's, if the categorical arguments are to be persuasive.

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Persona Non Grata: A Memoir of Disenchantment with the Cuban Revolution
by Jorge Edwards. New York, Paragon House, 1993. 294 pp. $27.95.

This is a difficult book for me to review. In 1971, just after the election of Salvador Allende, Jorge Edwards went to Havana to reopen the Chilean embassy.

He left three months later and in 1973 published this memoir. I read it then and reread it now in this belated but welcome English-language translation. In the early 1970s, *Persona Non Grata* was one of several testimonies of disenchantment: the Cuban revolution no longer seemed to offer the resplendent hope it once did to left-leaning intellectuals.

Indeed, in the aftermath of disastrous economic policies, Cuba turned to the then-extant model of state socialism and forged closer ties with the former Soviet Union. As Edwards notes: "spontaneity was inevitably and perhaps necessarily being supplanted by premeditation" (p. 66). The aura that had shielded the revolution quickly dissipated, and Cuba (almost) became just another communist country.

I remember my reaction at the time: Edwards is an arrogant Southern Coner who does not understand the complexities of a revolution at the doorstep of the United States. Then I buried the concerns his account raised. I was a graduate student, groping with issues of identity and politics, a young Cuban-American who sympathized with the revolution, and an aristocratic Chilean had but a slim chance of derailing me from the course my life was taking.

Rereading *Persona Non Grata* two decades later evoked in me a panoply of sentiments and thoughts. It stirred a sense of nostalgia for a different era. Chile under Allende and revolutionary Cuba together constituted an alternative for Latin America; the great Cuban writer, José Lezama Lima, was alive; Raúl Roa, a pugnacious, acerbic, and fiercely nationalistic intellectual, headed the Cuban Foreign Ministry; Ché Guevara and Régis Debray were household names; debating the merits of moral and material incentives made sense; many of us snickered with Fidel Castro when we read his words to Edwards—"We may not be very good at producing, but we're great at fighting" (p. 23). Now the Cuban revolution is dead, its dreams turned into a nightmare with no dawn quickly in sight, and I can no longer harbor the same illusions.

This second encounter with Edwards underscored a question I have increasingly asked myself over the past seven or eight years and for which, unfortunately, I lack a fully satisfactory answer. Was it legitimate to have and pursue those dreams? Undoubtedly, much of what Edwards narrates was true: the constant intrusion of state security; the irrepressible and autocratic energies of *el Commandante*; the harshness of everyday life—"Now you can't even find a guava," said a poor black woman (p. 83); the arrogance of power—"In Cuba we don't need critics. Criticizing is easy. We need doers, builders of society," pronounced a close Castro associate (p. 185). And yet, many of us dismissed this ugly underside because we had our sights and our hearts set elsewhere—and we hoped.

My answer is that the Cuban revolution was legitimate, even though today I am painfully aware—personally, politically, and intellectually—of the complexities and costs involved. As an individual who continues to confront issues of politics (not of identity anymore) and as a scholar who attempts to understand and interpret the Cuban experience, I cannot transpose today's irrefutable conclusion to the distant past when the reasons for hoping were still alive. And that

is why *Persona Non Grata*—a book that evidently has withstood the passage of time—was difficult to review.

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Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia *by Lenard J. Cohen. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1993. 299 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $16.95.*

One of the notable features in the discussions of Yugoslavia's demise has been a lack of adequate literature. Scholarship was late in analyzing the meaning of new ideologies and the implications of wholesale carnage. There is a reason for this omission. The so-called Yugoslav specialists, with only a few exceptions, have for a long time excelled in benighting sundry manuscripts with the rosy picture of Titoist "self-management" and nationality relations. When the prism of history turned to contention and then war, the journalists and itinerant pundits were quicker than the Yusoglav specialists and frequently produced better and more intelligent interpretations (Mark Thompson, Roy Gutman, Alain Finkelkraut).

The shelf is now crowded with all sorts of products, including rank propaganda, coffeetablers (Warner Books' *Sarajevo: A Portrait of the Siege*), and even child diaries (Zlata Filipović). But there is a bit of space left for the academic guild. Lenard J. Cohen is the first of the old Yugoslav specialists to step into this crack. His volume is calculated to avoid making a noise, lull us into forgetting his earlier books, and have us accept the old trivialities in new garb. It is a tedious and lazy book, written with the help of the ubiquitous and underpaid research assistant who goes under the name of FBIS-EEU. There are plenty of wordy and busy sentences. There is a cornucopia of historical howlers, especially when Cohen attempts to negotiate what he imagines to be the credits and demerits of yesteryear. In fact, his use of historical literature is so languishing that I was obliged to retake notice of various texts that are best forgotten.

Cohen's intention, it seems, was *not* to provide an interpretation. He has no thesis, unless one credits various banalities about the impact of the past, "interelite mistrust" and "heroic value orientation" (the latter borrowed from Vera Erlich's research on a qualitatively different war). He wanted to provide an analytical chronicle, a modest and important goal in which he doubly failed. First, Cohen has no imagination to understand or explain new political and ideological phenomena. For example, what is the meaning of Slobodan Milošević, his apartheid policies in Kosovo, his incendiary opportunism, new ideological concoctions, and war policies in Croatia and Bosnia? Second, Cohen genuinely believes that everybody is equally guilty in the Yugoslav meltdown, leading to a trimmed chronology of events with a vast potential to mislead.

Two dramatic instances will suffice to demonstrate the last point: Cohen devotes less than a sentence to the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy, a key document in the revival of Serbian nationalism (p. 53); he downplays and relativizes the meaning of "ethnic cleansing" and concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina (p. 239). In a word, Cohen is incapable of seeing the design behind the "spontaneity" of events. His world of cabinet theories has no connection with the real Balkan developments, including the abstract world of conflicting ideologies. Wittingly or not, his anemic narrative will be a great comfort to those who believe that the current Balkan war is too complex to understand or address. This book is too costly a platitude by anybody's standards.

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The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis *by Leslie Holmes. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 358 pp. Cloth, $57.00; paper, $16.95.*

"[C]orruption, and public reaction to it, was a primary factor leading to the collapse of communist power in the USSR in 1991, Eastern Europe from 1989, and to the Tiananmen incident . . ." (p. 214). Such is the thesis of *The End of Communist Power* by Leslie Holmes, a pioneer in the field of comparative communism.

Holmes develops two arguments in support of his ambitious thesis, the first heuristic, the second empirical. In an imaginative synthesis of Max Weber and Jurgen Habermas, he argues that the sources of authority in communist systems follow a predictable life path. Whereas communist systems in formation rely heavily on coercion and charismatic authority, mature communist states seek support in what he terms the "new traditionalism" (right to office comes with length in office) and "eudaemonism" (the material bond between state and citizenry). But eudaemonism has a serious, and potentially fatal, flaw. When a growing dependence on eudaemonism coincides with an economic crisis, as it did in most of the communist world in the 1980s, the result is a loss of support of the masses, who view the state as breaching its share of the social contract.

To regain mass support, reform-oriented leaders adopt two tactics. Cautiously at first, they move the basis of regime authority toward legal rationality as a means of invigorating the economy. At the same time, they expose parts of the system's corruption to public view, thereby venting mass frustration and weakening their elite opponents, who are more closely tied to the existing order. Both tactics have their dangers, however. The trend toward legal rationality, if pursued far enough, provokes a vigorous backlash by orthodox leaders and bureaucrats, who fear loss of their traditional power over words and things (ideology and the economy). Campaigning against corruption, for its part, can lead the masses to generalize their critique from official to officialdom to system.