

on Longfellow is significant in that it brings to light the importance for Martí of one of the giants of U.S. literature, long eclipsed by changes in literary taste, yet currently undergoing a reevaluation.

Martí's many references to other U.S. writers are glossed in Fountain's book, most importantly Martí's writings on Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry David Thoreau, and Mark Twain. Martí's comments on Hawthorne seem to be secondhand and are rife with generalities and clichés. These passing comments, more the work of the dutiful reporter than the literary critic, pale alongside the brilliance of Martí's treatment of Emerson and Whitman and of other, nonliterary aspects of the culture of the United States.

In a discussion of Martí's writings on Twain, Fountain suggests that Martí's literary criticism offers "a window on his precepts of literary criticism and a guide to his aesthetic preferences" (121). This is a vast territory in which the literature and culture of the United States hold a central position. Fountain's book offers a useful chart for a reading of Martí and his unquestionable indebtedness to U.S. writers.

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**Julia E. Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 248 pp.**

Julia Sweig has written a must-read book for Cubanists. *Inside the Cuban Revolution* takes an in-depth look at the revolutionary struggles of the 1950s using documents in Cuban archives never before accessed by scholars as well as interviews with Armando Hart, Ricardo Alarcón, Faure Chomón, Enrique Oltuski, and fifteen other veterans of the July 26 Movement (M267). The author claims to have debunked three myths about how and why Batista fell. The first and third are crucial and interconnected: the centrality of the Sierra Maestra in the struggle and the supreme prominence of Fidel Castro within the M267. The urban underground (*el Llano*) and its leaders, especially Frank País, are the stars of her narrative.

Sweig has documented the well-known tensions between *la Sierra* and *el Llano* more richly and solidly than anyone else. At issue was a primal difference over which revolutionary strategy should be given priority: a general strike and an urban-based insurrection to force Batista's resignation or a guerrilla insurgency to demolish the regular army. Castro, of course, favored the latter and underscored *el Llano's* responsibility for providing *la Sierra* with

weapons and supplies. Even after País's assassination in July 1957, *el Llano* leaders continued to pursue the strategy of urban insurrection while tending to *la Sierra's* constant demands. That the primary sources Sweig consulted corroborate that Castro managed to get a stranglehold on the M267 only after the failed strike of April 9, 1958, is a significant contribution to Cuban studies. After April 1958, *la Sierra's* strategy was paramount. Until then, however, the two wings of the M267 functioned with relative autonomy.

During the 1950s, Batista's opponents were of two minds: those who favored an electoral road map out of the national crisis and those who insisted on revolutionary violence against the dictator. The M267 unequivocally rejected the first, the *politiquería* that inevitably accompanied it being a central reason. *El Llano's* urban-based strategy, however, required an outreach to other opposition forces that *la Sierra's* did not. Only when he could dictate the terms of engagement (Sierra Pact, 1958) did Castro fully sanction this outreach. When mapping the convoluted pacts among opposition sectors and the eventual ascendance of Castro, the Rebel Army, and M267 in the anti-Batista struggle, *Inside the Cuban Revolution* shines. Of particular interest is Sweig's focus on the urban M267's work with labor groups — except those affiliated with the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) — in preparation for the strike of 1958.

While partly recognizing the political significance of *el Llano's* strategy, she does not fully grasp its profound implications. Had Batista resigned under the gun of a successful urban insurrection, *el Llano* would have been in a stronger position, and, consequently, different political dynamics would have likely driven the revolution's first year. Anticommunism was more pervasive among *el Llano* members, and the PSP, therefore, may not have gained the prominence it did. A successful urban insurrection would also have carried a victory more widely shared within the M267 and with other groups. *El Llano* had many more members and a more collective leadership than *la Sierra*; an April 9, 1958, that bore fruits would have required closer cooperation with a broader swathe of the opposition.

Sweig falters badly when she construes her second "myth": the importance of 1959. Watershed though it was, she declares its true context to be Cuba's quest for independence since the nineteenth century. This, of course, is the dominant paradigm of Cuban historiography, which she embraces as an article of faith. Unlike the other two myths, she brings to bear neither evidence nor argument on this one. Her understanding of Cuban history is superficial and marred by factual errors or unwarranted characterizations. Examples of factual errors: Carlos Hevia, not Ramón Grau, was the Auténtico presidential candidate in 1952 (5); elections were scheduled for June, not November (21); and the Communist Party controlled the labor movement until 1947, not 1949 (124). Giving *el Llano* its due place did not necessitate her taking a stand on Cuban

historiography, especially one done so haphazardly and gratuitously. The book would have been better served if the author had put forward just the two myths she so richly deflates.

*Inside the Cuban Revolution* has a blind spot. In the epilogue, Sweig makes parallels between the strategies that succeeded in the 1950s and those that have allowed the Cuban government to weather the end of the cold war. She chose to conclude with a statement about the regime's succession after Castro and an implicit rebuke of the U.S. embargo. Fine, but her exceptional research should have provoked hard questions about the eighteen months after January 1, 1959. What happened to the M267? Why did so many of its members take up arms against the revolutionary government? Answering these questions would have entailed conducting interviews in Miami. Studying Cuba is not just about scholarship, and so it is with Julia Sweig as well.

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**Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds. *Cuban Communism, 1959–2003*. 11th edition. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2003. 735 pp.**

This is the 11th edition of *Cuban Communism*, and from its title, one would expect it to be updated to the year 2003. But one would be disappointed. The previous edition, the 10th, was published in 2000. Only 8 of the 39 chapters in the latest edition were written or updated after that, and several of those are seriously out of date. There is not a word, for example, in Jorge F. Pérez-López's chapter "Cuba's Stalled Reforms" about the Helms-Burton Act and its effect on the Cuban government's decisions. Yet the chapter was written in 2001; the Helms-Burton Act was passed in 1996, and many analysts attribute Cuba's decision to slow the reform process to its passage.

That causal relationship is ignored or distorted by other authors as well. In his chapter "Cuba: Without Subsidies," for example, Jaime Suchlicki implies that the reforms ended *before* passage of Helms-Burton.

But I was in Havana in January of 1996, that is, before Helms-Burton, and was told by everyone I interviewed in the Economy Ministry and various other government agencies that the reforms were marching forward and that the Small Business Law, the next major step, would be approved that year. I was there again several months later, after passage of Helms-Burton, to find a dramatically changed outlook. The Small Business Law, I was told, would be put on the shelf and many of the other reforms postponed. Why? Because, several friends confided, the passage of Helms-Burton had given the hardliners