

of the United States. Although internally each chapter is presented chronologically, the overall thematic structure may be confusing to readers totally unfamiliar with Nicaragua, since one must jump back and forth between chapters to keep track of the chronological events.

The major new contribution of this edition is the expansion into the recent developments in Nicaragua. The reader will learn how the 1990 electoral defeat of the FSLN transformed the country and began a reversal of most of the social gains of the revolution. For example, Walker notes that in 1990 the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index had Nicaragua ranked 60th among countries of the world. By 1997 Nicaragua had dropped to 127th and by 2002 had inched back up only to 116th (p. 134).

Since this edition is updated but not revised, scholars who specialize in Nicaragua will find little new. It reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the earlier editions. While Walker acknowledges the continuing research into Nicaragua in his excellent annotated bibliography, there are sections of the text that needed to be revised to reflect these new works. For example, the chapter on the development of Nicaragua's economy around coffee depended heavily on Jaime Wheelock Roman's influential, but now outdated, book *Imperialismo y Dictadura*, which was first published in 1975. New scholarly works have expanded and questioned many aspects of Wheelock's work, but Walker has not incorporated these new views into the text.

Despite these minor drawbacks, the fourth edition of *Nicaragua* is once again the essential introduction to modern Nicaragua, and an excellent choice for classroom use. Undergraduate students especially will find the book helpful and accessible since it is well written, concise, and filled with many interesting photographs and cartoons.

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State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940.

By Robert Whitney. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 255. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$49.95 cloth; \$18.95 paper.

The revolution is a burden on the study of Cuba. Scholars have yet to put it in perspective as they have for Mexico's, Russia's, and China's revolutions with their respective historiographies. In grappling with the revolution, Cubanists have tended to fall prey to one or another teleology—whether the predominant belief that the island's history unfolded a radical design that came to fruition in 1959, or the opposite, less-elaborated notion that Cuba's calling as a civic, sovereign republic was always around a corner that was never quite turned before the revolution preempted it. Each is pregnant with inevitability: the first, with the idea that socialism constituted the antidote to the ills of dependent capitalism; the second, with the assumptions of the old school of modernization. Historical trajectories, however, are riddled with contingencies, opportunities, and junctures.

Robert Whitney means to chip away at the radical teleology by focusing on “the political and economic conjuncture of 1920” and the outcome of “the constitutional consensus of 1940” (p. 12). An up-close read renders the book impressive: Whitney ably documents the narrative and mostly keeps the revolution of 1959 at bay. Unfortunately, the author loses considerable ground with the conceptual architecture he erects to interpret the 1920s and 1930s. In a nutshell, he argues that between 1920 and 1940, Cuba moved from “oligarchic” rule to a “nominal” constitutional democracy, a transition that was largely midwived by the mobilization of the *clases populares*. This edifice stands on three faults: the concept of oligarchy; the use of “nominal” as a qualifier of constitutional democracy; and his misreading of mobilizations before 1920.

Whitney’s definition of an oligarchy in Cuba is confused. The term becomes an umbrella for the political class and the “sugar-growing” elite (colonos grew cane; hacendados owned the cane-processing mills), while identifying professional politicians, large-scale sugar growers (wrongly identified as hacendados), large-scale commercial and import-export capitalists, and factory owners as “upper classes” and “elites” (p. 6). It is not, moreover, clear if these three terms are interchangeable. The use of oligarchy is also confusing. Cuba was not an “overwhelmingly agrarian society” (p. 177), at least not in the Latin American sense of the traditional ties that bound together landlords and peasants; relations between hacendados and mill workers were decidedly modern. An aspect of the Cuban experience that sorely needs attention is, in fact, the absence of Barrington Moore’s “reactionary configuration.” In addition, collapsing the political class into the “oligarchy” is particularly unhelpful in the light of so much recent scholarship that underscores the benefits of understanding politics and political actors in their own terms.

Why qualify the political system ushered in by the Constitution of 1940 as a “nominal constitutional democracy”? Whitney implicitly devalues the 1940 consensus and, by so doing, inadvertently brings in the revolution of 1959 through the back door. His concluding chapter almost implies a certain inevitability to the denouement of the old Cuba at the end of the 1950s. The book would have been better served by a conclusion that took the 1940 consensus in and of itself, a crucial element of which was the hope that all major actors—including the popular classes—deposited in the progressive constitution. Instead, the final fast-forward only highlights how important it is for Cuban studies to embrace fully a sensibility for contingencies, opportunities, and junctures.

Though the focus on the popular struggles is the book’s strength, Whitney underestimates how mobilized the republic was from the outset. José Martí had infused the cause of *Cuba libre* with populist overtones that the War of 1895 only made louder: Cubans of color and of humble means constituted the bulk of the Liberation Army. Opposed in some quarters, universal male suffrage was the only acceptable term of citizenship in the fledgling republic, and thus politicians—unlike those in Latin America immediately after independence or early in the twentieth century—had to appeal to a mass base. While popular mobilizations undoubtedly

reached a different and decisive order in the 1920s and 1930s, the prior two decades were not bereft of them. It is, indeed, peculiar that a historian did not look back at the beginning of the book with the same eagerness as he looked forward at the end.

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The Archaeologist Was A Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence. By Charles H. Harris and Louis R. Sadler. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003. Pp. xiv, 450. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$32.95 cloth.

This book explores a hitherto unknown aspect of the life of the famous Maya archaeologist Sylvanus G. Morley: his activities as the lead spy for the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in Central America during World War I. At a time when none of the U.S. intelligence services were adequately prepared for the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, Harris and Sadler reveal that Morley used his cover as a scholar in order to investigate German war plans in southern Mexico and Central America. In particular, Morley sought information on the existence of German submarine bases, one of the worst fears of the U.S. government during the war. Although the Germans had not built such bases, and the archaeologist thus made no grand discoveries, Morley's travels between April 1917 and March 1919 accomplished something even more important: the establishment of an intelligence network that would yield great dividends as the U.S. government sought to establish its hegemony over a politically unstable isthmus during the 1920s.

This is a very readable, entertaining, and interesting book. Based on decades of research in seventeen U.S. and British archives and libraries, Harris and Sadler take the reader on a fascinating tour of Central America as Morley fights malaria and fleas, escapes a variety of assassination attempts, and survives on beans and water when he spends eighteen days on a forsaken 500-foot island. Fourteen short chapters introduce the reader to the beginnings of U.S. intelligence (itself an overlooked topic), U.S. war preparations during the First World War, and Morley's establishment of an intelligence network on a trip of almost one thousand miles through Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Belize, and the Mexican states of Yucatán and Quintana Roo. Leading a double life as a spy and a scholar, Morley provided the U.S. intelligence community with valuable assessments on German activities in the Central American isthmus. His reports were reassuring to an administration that feared the sudden appearance of U-boats off the U.S. coastline, and contributed to allaying U.S. concerns about German plans in the immediate vicinity of the United States. In turn, by soothing these fears, Morley helped the U.S. government focus its energies on Europe, where they were needed the most during the war.

As the first book on a topic that has too long been ignored, this study raises important questions for further research. Most importantly, following up on Friedrich Katz's seminal work on German policies in Mexico, we need a parallel