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*Comparative Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Oct., 1999), pp. 63-82.

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*Comparative Politics* is currently published by Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York.

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# Caught in a Contradiction

## Cuban Socialism between Mobilization and Normalization

*Marifeli Pérez-Stable*

Since 1989, when the Communist regimes of eastern Europe fell, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and the United States tightened its economic embargo, the world has been awaiting the downfall of Fidel Castro. So far he has failed to oblige. It is not entirely surprising that Cuban state socialism has not yet suffered the same fate as its erstwhile eastern European allies since, unlike them, its political vitality never depended on the Soviet Union. The Cuban revolution rode to power on the crest of a national insurgency against a U.S.-supported and widely unpopular dictatorship, and Cuban leaders have successfully defied nine U.S. presidents. That in the 1990s the Cuban government has reconstituted itself in the face of inordinate adversity and managed, like China, Vietnam, and North Korea, to persist in a post-cold-war environment can in part be attributed to the virtually inexhaustible fount of nationalism. However, Cuba, unlike China and Vietnam, has not initiated economic reforms and, unlike North Korea, does not subsist in hermetic isolation. What accounts for its resilience?

Though the dramatic events of 1989 temporarily led social scientists to recast the analysis of state socialism in terms of its collapse, they quickly returned their attention to the more salient intellectual charge of determining how this social formation actually functioned over decades.<sup>1</sup> Since the mid 1980s studies of the institutional dynamics of state socialism have focused on a “master process” of social change involving three types of interactions: between central planning and incipient markets, between state institutions and civil society, and within the regime’s own institutions.<sup>2</sup> State socialist transformations and market transitions are the often unintended consequences of the efforts by Communist parties to modify the operation of the central plan; these modifications in turn create new opportunity structures and centers of power largely but not exclusively outside party-state institutions. The reform experiences of post-1956 eastern Europe and post-1978 China have provided the empirical basis for the institutionalist paradigm.

State socialism in Cuba, however, suggests a more politically centered drive. The Cuban regime never completely implemented old-fashioned market socialism, nor has it presently embarked upon far-reaching market reforms. While the forces of the “master process” of institutional interactions are partially at work in the economy and the regime, Castro’s Cuba, like Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s

China, demonstrates the importance of elites and ideology. Castro's leadership and radical nationalism are still pivotal; their institutional setting differs from the one analyzed in the literature. Moreover, the U.S. embargo notwithstanding, Cuba's geography and culture have precluded the option of virtual seclusion that is a central component of North Korean state socialism.

The purpose at hand is twofold. First, I cursorily review the study of state socialism as proposed by institutionalism. Its tenets constitute a persuasive social scientific framework only after state socialist regimes have implemented political and economic "normalization." They can not be usefully applied to Stalinist eastern Europe or Maoist China and do not quite explain Cuba under Fidel Castro. Understanding state socialism before and during normalization is, nonetheless, an important dimension in discerning the social formation's historical experience. In fact, the institutionalist literature does not account for the crucial transition process from economic hypercentralization, more ideologically driven politics, and autocratic leadership in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe after Stalin and in China after Mao or even for the way Stalinism and Maoism functioned in their heyday. This literature focuses instead on the consequences *ex post facto*; it best explains the "posttotalitarian" regimes of state socialism, not the phase of "totalitarianism."<sup>3</sup> In contemporary Cuba partial economic reforms coexist with charismatic authority and mobilizational politics, a combination that has prevented a full normalization of state socialism along the known paths of post-1956 eastern Europe and contemporary Asia.

Second, I present an overview of "mobilizational authoritarianism," the motor of state socialism in Cuba.<sup>4</sup> Rooted in Castro's charismatic leadership, the ideological canon of sovereignty and equality, and some level of mass mobilization, this mode of governing prevents the interactions of state, markets, and society—the "master process"—from fully taking hold and transforming Cuban state socialism in ways similar to eastern Europe, China, and Vietnam. The Cuban regime has yet to embrace a program of economic transformation that fully sustains these interactions. Instead, mobilizational authoritarianism relies on military and political institutions, while attempting to restrain market-based interactions in Cuban society.

### **Change and Stability in State Socialism**

The central tenet of institutionalism is that state socialism is a distinctive social formation with its own institutional logic and developmental dynamics. During the 1980s analysts belonging to this school focused on the institutions of central planning and the Communist party. According to their view, Communist party regimes initially attempted to "build socialism" by establishing a central plan to guide the economy and rallying the "masses" around the goal of a communist utopia. As sustained economic growth and improved living standards eluded these regimes, they

introduced market reforms. With the gradual modification of central planning, the state's tutelage over society was partially loosened. These analysts looked beyond the politico-ideological claims of socialist societies and focused on their institutional structures; they also made fruitful use of the new empirical evidence provided by the opportunities for social scientific fieldwork in eastern Europe and China during the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>5</sup> In a first wave, institutionalists focused on the character of the socialist economy: its cycles of centralization and decentralization, patterns of labor utilization, interaction with the informal sector, and endemic shortages.<sup>6</sup> The new analysis tempered the preeminence accorded to elites in older approaches such as totalitarianism and pluralism by highlighting the role of subordinate social groups in shaping socialist societies. While ordinary people may not have wielded power, their actions (or inactions) often limited the options of decision makers and sometimes subverted their policies.<sup>7</sup>

In the 1990s a second wave has further advanced the institutionalist paradigm. More recent institutionalists are skeptical that the emergence of civil society entirely accounts for the disintegration of state socialism. Instead, they have put forth a more regime-centered framework that places the motor for change within state and party institutions rather than in the tensions between state and society. They see market reforms as gradually weakening the political foundations of Communist regimes in a concatenation of mostly unintended consequences. The party-state apparatus can not function in the old mode when alternatives to state employment develop, state enterprises are subjected to budgetary discipline, and fiscal reforms allow regions and local communities to retain more of their revenues. Under these conditions Communist party rule either declines irreversibly as in Hungary or undergoes substantial change as in China. Hence the inner core of state socialism also includes a politically rooted institutional dimension.<sup>8</sup>

Institutionalism has made striking progress in the study of state socialist societies. The "master process," however, can not be applied wholesale to socialist regimes in which charismatic leadership and revolutionary ideology are still central elements of the political system. Implicit to institutionalism is normalization of the political system; revolutionary ideology, mass mobilizations, and charismatic leadership are central to an earlier moment of state socialism. Though after normalization Communist parties do not relinquish their exclusive claim to power, they become more attentive to the exigencies of daily life and less preoccupied with the callings of history. Once they accept the necessity of market reforms, they also recognize the need to govern on a different basis: improving living standards, not constructing a superior alternative to capitalism, becomes the political compass. The cycles of advancement and retrenchment take place within a consensus on the infeasibility of hypercentralized planning and mobilizational politics. The summons to "eat sausage" (as in Hungary after 1956) and to "get rich" (as in China after 1978) are laden as much with political as with economic import. The Soviet Union of the 1930s, Hungary during the

early 1950s, and China in the 1960s did not generate the dominant pattern of interactions that institutionalists rightly attribute to eastern Europe, China, and Vietnam during the 1980s. Thus, Stalinism and Maoism, like *Fidelismo*, lie largely outside the bounds of this “master process.”

Unlike most other state socialist societies, Cuba has never entirely entered the realm in which these interactions would be most relevant.<sup>9</sup> While cycles of advancement and retrenchment have also characterized the Cuban economy, they have not principally responded to the pattern proposed by institutionalism. A dual dynamic more accurately accounts for Cuba’s oscillations: on the one hand, the well-known tension between central planning and market correctives; on the other, the more important tension between the “normal” politics of state socialism and mobilizational authoritarianism. Fidel Castro’s impact on how Cuba is governed is a political fact that can not be accurately considered within the dynamics specified by the institutionalist analysis; mobilizational politics has largely prevented their developmental logic from settling Cuban state socialism.

Admiring though he is of China’s ability to resist democracy, Castro simply can not subscribe to Deng Xiaoping’s precept: “To get rich is glorious!” As argued below, neither Cuba’s economy nor its political system can be said to be altogether on institutional tracks paralleling those of eastern Europe before 1989 or China and Vietnam in the 1990s. The seesaw of the Cuban economy is not hinged on a consensus around a program of reform like the new economic mechanism in Hungary, *doi moi* in Vietnam, and the post-1978 restructuring in China. Rather, it is precariously balanced between market imperatives and mobilizational politics, the latter thus far more determinant. Consequently, the political dynamics of economic reforms in Cuba are quite different from those in pre-1989 eastern Europe or in China and Vietnam today. To the extent there is decentralization in Cuba, for example, it is not primarily market or fiscal but rather administrative; consequently, state and party institutions have not generated the type of intraregime interactions over resource allocation that provoked the transformation of Communist party rule in Hungary and are creating a sort of new federalism in China.<sup>10</sup> In short, even in the 1990s, when market reforms have advanced further than ever, the stipulated tenets of institutionalism alone can not illuminate the dynamics of state socialism in Cuba. Mobilizational authoritarianism preempts the normal institutional interactions that preceded the downfall of eastern European Communism and are recasting the Chinese and Vietnamese regimes.<sup>11</sup>

### **Mobilizational Authoritarianism: The Motor of State Socialism in Cuba**

Since 1959 Cuban politics has rested on the tripod of mobilizational authoritarianism: the leadership of Fidel Castro, the mobilization of the masses, and the defense

of *la patria* (the homeland). The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the armed forces have provided the tripod's primary institutional foundation. Although it lays sole claim to power, the party, with Castro at its helm, has not altogether acquired the routines of Communist rule in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe after 1956. The political system has embodied contrasting models of the relationship between charismatic and institutional authority.<sup>12</sup>

During the 1960s the first model rejected market reforms and proposed mass mobilizations as the "politically correct" remedy to the problems of central planning and the complacency of the bureaucracy. However, like the Chinese Cultural Revolution, this "radical experiment" dislocated the economy and undercut institutions.<sup>13</sup> Castro and his inner core of advisors dictated policy directions and supervised their implementation. Only in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the leadership implemented some market reforms, did the political system partially gain the normal trappings of state socialism. For example, the Communist party and the mass organizations held regular congresses; the central committee and the political bureau met on a scheduled basis; assemblies of popular power were organized and local elections held. This second model fostered relative institutionalization and broadened leadership, more orderly citizen involvement in local affairs, and noticeable improvements in living standards.

Nonetheless, institutionalization never reached an irreversible momentum. At the crucial crossroads of the mid 1980s when Cuba confronted a downturn in the economy and prospects of diminishing Soviet aid, Castro—not the party or a faction of it—called for cutting back market reforms and renewing mobilizational politics. Subsequently, Cuba entered a period initially called "rectification" and later "the special period in peacetime" that combined elements of the mobilizational and institutionalized prototypes.

Mobilizational authoritarianism can not be understood exclusively in terms of its repressive component. For the better part of its tenure, the Cuban government enjoyed outright popular support, or at least open-minded consideration by the majority of the leadership's direction. The memory of 1959 cast a long shadow of legitimacy over Cuban state socialism. Unlike pre-1989 eastern European regimes, the government managed to maintain sufficient credibility to resort to mobilizational politics. In contrast to China and Vietnam, Cuba's leadership prefers to continue mobilizational politics rather than take the political risks implicit in more comprehensive market reforms. Without some measure of popular support or receptivity, the Cuban leadership could not have espoused this style of politics. As a governing strategy, however, mobilizational authoritarianism over time has been self-depleting. It manifests two central weaknesses.

During the preparations for the 1991 party congress Cuban leaders succinctly recognized a crucial failing of the political system. Although they claimed pre-congress assemblies yielded unanimous support for "the Party, the Revolution, and...comrade

Fidel,” they simultaneously underscored the imperative of overcoming the persistent pitfalls of *la doble moral* (duplicity) and *el afán de unanimidad* (eagerness to achieve unanimity).<sup>14</sup> The political system, however, is bereft of the institutions and guarantees to overcome these pitfalls. Cuban politics is “absolutist”: it allows no compromise on the vision of *la patria* consecrated by the revolution.<sup>15</sup> Iron-clad unity is portrayed by the leadership as the *sine qua non* of national sovereignty; the expression of individual or sectoral interests is regarded as contrary to the national interest; acceptance of *el comandante*’s incontestable primacy is an inviolable imperative. The political system is patently lacking in institutions supportive of the diversity in Cuban society and respectful of the expression of individualism. Herein lies the first political weakness of mobilizational authoritarianism; during the 1990s the wellspring of popular support and goodwill has been considerably depleted.

Although massive demonstrations have been trademarks of Cuban politics, the government has resorted to them infrequently in the 1990s. During the summer of 1994, when 32,000 people left on rafts, only one such expression of “popular support” was organized, to mourn a young black policeman who died attempting to stop a boat hijacking. After the government stopped patrolling Cuban coasts, the would-be rafters openly paraded to the points of departure, carrying their boats or the materials to build them, without interference or denunciation. In contrast to the Mariel exodus of 1980, the government never resorted to *el pueblo* (the people) to repudiate those who were abandoning the island. On August 5, 1995, the first anniversary of antigovernment riots on the *Malecón* (Havana’s waterfront), the leadership convened a mass demonstration of “revolutionary affirmation”; tens of thousands responded while the government mobilized a large security contingent for their protection.<sup>16</sup> Only with such careful controls could the government still rely on the expression of popular support. Significantly, after the Cuban air force shot down two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 and President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act in March 1996, the Cuban government did not immediately mobilize the “masses” to support the downing and repudiate the new law. While shortly thereafter on May 1 hundreds of thousands of people rallied under nationalist banners in Havana’s Plaza of the Revolution, the gathering was significant for its rarity and its carefully orchestrated character. Mobilizational authoritarianism’s second weakness, therefore, lies in its inability to deliver the images or substance of political strength it once did.

The United States is an essential prop of mobilizational authoritarianism. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations before 1959 and the record of U.S. policy since then vindicate the Cuban government’s profound mistrust of Washington and the nationalist sentiments of Cuba’s citizenry. Still, without “Yankee imperialism” and the real or imagined threat of U.S. military action against the island, Fidel Castro would find it difficult to sustain his praetorian politics. While Castro may not know how to govern differently, nine U.S. presidents have bolstered his rule by allowing him to play David to their Goliath. U.S. policy lends substance to the nationalist fears of millions

of Cubans and credibility to the Cuban government's insistence on unwavering unity for the sake of *la patria*. Castro's affirmation that "we are the only ones and there is no alternative" rings true with sufficient numbers of Cubans who continue to provide the popular though weakened brace for mobilizational authoritarianism.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1990s the Cuban leadership has outlined a governance blueprint for a national emergency, ranging from U.S. aggression to domestic chaos, that boldly underscores its praetorian postulates as well as its steeled resolve to remain in power. In 1991 the PCC congress passed a resolution empowering the central committee to take all necessary steps to uphold the government, including the suspension of civilian institutions. In 1992 the constitution was revised to include three new security-related articles for the establishment of a national defense council, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the recognition of the people's right to resort to armed struggle in defense of the "revolution." At the same time the government announced the formation of the Association of Combatants of the Cuban Revolution, a veterans' organization, that parallels civilian organizations at all levels and is charged with the "unconditional defense of the nation, the revolution, and socialism."<sup>18</sup> In 1994 the national assembly passed a defense and national security law. Feasible or not, this blueprint for a national emergency government reveals a deeply seated siege mentality, the imprimatur of mobilizational authoritarianism. In March 1996 Armed Forces Minister Raúl Castro, Fidel's younger brother, called for "ideological warfare" against those aiming to subvert the "revolution" and exhorted the populace to weed out the "fifth columnists" and to prepare itself to resist a new offensive by the United States.<sup>19</sup>

The politics of state socialism in Cuba provides an environment for market reform distinctly different from that of eastern Europe, China, and Vietnam. Reinforcing the role of the state in the economy whenever possible, the Cuban government loudly declares politics to be still very much in command. Mobilizational authoritarianism plainly takes precedence over a more coherent reform program. True economic restructuring would require a new discourse designed to appeal to new constituencies and to goad old ones in new directions; there is no evidence of such a change in contemporary Cuba. Castro is not about to rouse the masses by urging them to get rich and to eat *chorizo* (sausage). Under extraordinary duress and against the grain of its preferences, the Cuban government has adopted some market reforms in the 1990s; mobilizational authoritarianism, however, constitutes an inhospitable ambience for them to propel an institutional transformation of Cuban society as in China and Vietnam or an intraregime erosion as in Hungary.

### **Mobilizational Politics and the Cuban Economy**

In 1986 the market socialist model that had been partially implemented since 1976 reached a crossroads: broader application of market mechanisms or retrenchment.

Though the decision was to retrench, it was initiated by Fidel Castro, not by the Communist party. The party routinely reviewed the state of the nation at its congress' first session in February. Between April and June, however, Castro unfolded a wholesale critique of the economic system, lambasting self-interest and market imperatives. In May the shutdown of peasant markets, which had successfully functioned since 1980, set the tone for further changes. In July the government published a report detailing a gamut of problems, underscoring the centrality of political considerations. At December's closing session the party congress delineated a policy of "rectifying errors and negative tendencies" allegedly spawned by the 1976–1985 planning system. Although rectification did not represent a full retreat to the radical policies of the late 1960s, it was rooted in a mobilizational style that, by the mid 1980s, had been discredited in the rest of the socialist world. Without Castro's intervening cue, the PCC lacked the institutional wherewithal to initiate a major policy shift, either to broaden or to retrench market socialism. At the crossroads of 1986, charismatic, not institutional, authority proved determinant.

In the mid 1980s Cuba confronted mounting economic problems. The flow of trade, credits, and aid from the Soviet Union, which had sustained the Cuban economy since the 1960s, was already abating. Hard currency debt had risen to about \$700 per capita, and payments on it represented nearly 60 percent of hard currency exports. Sugar prices were declining, a distressing signal for an economy still dependent on monoculture. The low productivity endemic to central planning, moreover, remained characteristic of the Cuban economy. Growth rates averaged about 5 percent a year only in the 1970s and early 1980s; by 1985 the economy once again stagnated.<sup>20</sup> Whereas almost all state socialist regimes had by then embraced some kind of market reform as an unavoidable antidote to the inefficiency of planned economies, Cuba insisted on state-centered policies. Although it could have grappled with the economy's difficulties by more aggressively implementing market socialist measures, the Cuban leadership chose to retrench.<sup>21</sup> That choice reflected a political calculus.

Continuation of market socialism implied further economic decentralization. With its emphasis on enterprise autonomy and individual initiatives, market reform threatened the mobilizational linchpin of Cuban politics. The 1976–1985 model, Cuban leaders argued, undermined the national resolve against the United States by promoting inequalities, emphasizing individual incentives, and fostering corruption. In addition, market socialism placed economic imperatives and a planning technocracy at the heart of decision making, which in turn suggested a changed role for the political leadership. As long as Cuba remained under Castro's leadership and was besieged by the U.S., the sectors that had supported the 1976–1985 model and might have crafted a *perestroika*, *doi moi*, or Chinese alternative were simply bereft of political and ideological clout.

After the collapse of European Communism and the cutback in trade with the

Soviet Union, the Cuban government devised an alternative framework for economic survival. Although the new strategy included some structural reforms, mostly in the foreign trade sector, its heart resided in a food production program to promote self-sufficiency through state agriculture and voluntary labor mobilizations. The strategy included a package of state-propelled, nonmarket austerity measures, such as reducing electrical consumption and oil deliveries, further rationing food products and consumer goods, and cutting back bureaucratic personnel. While accepting decentralization in the economy's external sector, the government continued to insist on state-centered and mobilizational responses on the domestic front. At its 1991 congress the Communist party resisted the reopening of the peasant markets and persisted with the food plan despite its mixed results. Between 1989 and 1993 the economy contracted between 35 and 50 percent.<sup>22</sup>

Not until 1993 did the government begin to take steps to address the profound economic crisis by implementing some domestic market reforms, for example, making the dollar legal tender, liberalizing agricultural cooperatives, and legalizing self-employment in a limited number of activities.<sup>23</sup> Since then the leadership has stayed the course of reform only within the mobilizational paradigm. That is, Cuban state socialism ebbs and flows between mobilizational politics and market imperatives; advancement and retrenchment occur between these two models, not within market socialism. Cuba has yet to reach a reform consensus among elites comparable to those of Hungary (1968), China (1978), and Vietnam (1986). The government's hesitation to adopt more far-reaching market reforms illustrates the contradictions between mobilizational authoritarianism and socialist normalization.

In contrast to China and Vietnam, Cuban leaders, first, remain committed to keeping politics in the economy. After the first round of reform measures in 1993, the next move would have been to broaden market-based resource allocation and promote the private sector (foreign and national). Instead, in December 1993 Castro railed against capitalism and the "excesses" of the profit motive and called for workplace assemblies to discuss additional economic reforms. Held in early 1994, the assemblies predictably yielded the support of *el pueblo* for Castro's position: reforms had to be "politically correct" and could "never" compromise socialism. Subsequently, there was cautious movement forward with selected price increases, a new tax system, and free markets for agricultural products and light consumer durables. In the summer of 1995, however, Castro noted: "If there has to be more opening, we will do it, though I do not see an immediate need for that."<sup>24</sup> Since then, political priorities have overtaken the process of economic reforms.

Second, the government has not formulated a more comprehensive program for economic transformation.<sup>25</sup> Cutting back subsidies for state enterprises and liberalizing Cuban entrepreneurship are two crucial measures needed for economic recovery. The former carries two obvious dangers for those in power: massive unemployment and a reduced state sector; the latter, which would alleviate unemployment, is an

unavoidable complement to the first. While in 1995 the government authorized additional activities for self-employment, it continues to dampen private initiatives by sporadically confiscating "illicit gains," harassing "profiteers," and imposing stiff taxes payable in hard currency; it has therefore disabused any expectation of legalization of Cuban entrepreneurship.<sup>26</sup> Although the Cuban leadership remains more open to liberalization in the external sector, the foreign investment law of 1995 embodies the official ambivalence. On the one hand, it allows for wholly foreign-owned ventures, sanctions foreign ownership of real estate, and generally improves the climate for foreign investment. On the other hand, the state retains full control of labor; foreign investors still can not hire and pay workers directly. (Foreign direct investment is, at any rate, quite modest. During the 1990s the government received commitments of \$2.1 billion and probably well under \$1 billion in actual investments.<sup>27</sup>) The reform process remains mired in the mobilizational paradigm of Cuban politics and thus can not be understood primarily through the interactions proposed by institutionalism.

### **The Logic of Political Change in Cuba in the 1990s**

In the 1990s the Cuban leadership has reaffirmed the long-standing tenets of mobilizational authoritarianism: the centrality of Fidel Castro, the imperative of mass mobilizations, and the defense of *la patria*. Although reluctantly open to partial economic reforms, the government adamantly resists significant changes in the political system. Nonetheless, in 1989 domestic and international events forced the leadership to take stock. Domestically, the drug-related trials of high-ranking officers in the armed forces and the interior ministry bared an unprecedented elite crisis.<sup>28</sup> Internationally, the fall of eastern European Communism belied the premise of the irreversibility of socialism. Under markedly inauspicious circumstances, Cuban leaders have manifested an impressive political resilience and resourcefulness. Changes in three areas of the political system are indicative of these qualities: the character of elites, the reform of popular power assemblies, and the role of the military.

**The Character of Elites** Under Castro's leadership the Cuban government has been unusually adept at keeping a united front and promoting mobility within its ranks. In the 1990s it succeeded in reconfiguring itself without endangering its political cohesion. While factions have existed and continue to exist in the Cuban leadership, their conflicts have thus far had modest repercussions. Unlike China and Vietnam, where reforms have usually advanced after a period of elite struggles, the factional differences among Cuban elites have not promoted a momentum for economic, let alone political, reform.<sup>29</sup> That the leadership avoided a schism and effec-

tively fostered significant elite rotation are important measures of political adaptability and endurance. A united, politicized (as opposed to technocratic) elite within the Communist party is essential to mobilizational politics.

Since 1989 Cuban leaders have successfully met the challenge of rotation and unity in at least five instances. First, in 1989, when the drug-related trials shook the armed forces and particularly the interior ministry, extensive turnover of high and middle level state security officers followed.<sup>30</sup> The armed forces also experienced turnover, though not as widely. Second, the 1991 PCC congress significantly renovated the central committee. More than two-thirds of its members were newly elected or promoted to full membership; the 1991 central committee was also more representative of ordinary citizens (as opposed to cadres), the under-fifty generations, those with higher educational levels, and the provinces.<sup>31</sup> In October 1997 the party congress partially reversed these trends. The new central committee, reduced from 225 to 150, included more party cadres, military officers, and state administrators, while ordinary citizens declined by three-quarters.<sup>32</sup> Third, the composition of national assembly deputies elected in 1993 and 1998 showed similar trends.<sup>33</sup> Fourth, in 1994 the party replaced seven of the fourteen provincial secretaries with younger cadres; in 1995 three additional provinces received new PCC secretaries.<sup>34</sup> Finally, in January 1995 the council of state announced a major cabinet reshuffle, in which seven younger, presumably more reform-oriented individuals assumed the economic ministries.<sup>35</sup> Rotation also took place at lower levels of the PCC, the ministries, the mass organizations, and popular power.<sup>36</sup>

That Cuban elites have weathered what seemed to be insurmountable difficulties underscores their mettle and bolsters their self-confidence. Under Castro's leadership, they moreover manifest no doubt about their sense of purpose and are determined to defend their power at all costs. In this political sense, Cuba most resembles China, Vietnam, and North Korea and differs most from eastern European *apparatchiki*.

**The Reform of Popular Power Assemblies** In 1992 the Cuban government modified electoral laws to allow for the direct election of deputies to the national and provincial assemblies of popular power, the quasi-legislature. As in the past, however, only official candidates could reasonably run. Elections have been held in 1992–1993 (all levels), 1995 (local assemblies), and 1997–98 (all levels). In 1992, 1995, and 1997 delegates for local assemblies were chosen for two-and-a-half-year terms in races featuring at least two candidates, standard practice since the inception of popular power in 1976. In 1993 and 1998 deputies to the national assembly and provincial assemblies were elected to five-year terms. In these instances there was only one nominee per seat, and candidates needed more than fifty percent of the validly cast ballots to be elected. Thus, at the national and provincial levels citizens had only a negative choice: they could withhold their vote for particular candidates,

register a blank ballot, or abstain from voting altogether. Only the first set of elections in 1992–1993 proved to be politically significant. The government had to choose between allowing independent candidates to run and reinforcing the mobilizational paradigm. It chose the latter. Subsequent elections merely extended the experience of 1992–1993.

The 1992–1993 two-step electoral process resulted in distinctively different outcomes. In December more than 97 percent of the electorate turned out to vote for local delegates. Various sources estimated that up to one-third cast invalid (blank or defaced) ballots, an act tantamount to an antigovernment vote.<sup>37</sup> Initially, the government neither refuted these estimates nor gave its own figure. Two months later it admitted to less than 15 percent null or void votes; the final official figure was ten percent.<sup>38</sup> Undoubtedly, the much delayed and amended official reaction lent credibility to the unofficial estimates.

Cuban leaders were obviously surprised. Up to one-third of the electorate sent them a strong and unexpected message. Business could not be allowed to proceed as usual in February. The party prepared for the second round for national and provincial deputies as it had not for the first; indeed, the intensity of the February “campaigning” also supported the unofficial estimates of invalid ballots cast in December. The government’s overriding objective was to demonstrate an “indisputable” popular mandate. First, Castro, Cuban nationalist par excellence, made a patriotic appeal to vote in favor of all the candidates; *la patria* demanded a demonstration of unity rather than a selective vote. Conveniently, the tightening of the U.S. embargo by the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 lent new urgency to Castro’s summons to patriotism. Second, the government exerted pressure and intimidation to bring the stray one-third back into the fold and to dissuade other citizens from invalidating their ballots or voting selectively. It updated voter registration lists, increased the number of polling places, and sent the neighborhood committee leadership to visit every home to instruct the citizenry on the allegedly complex voting procedures.

On February 24 more than 99 percent of the electorate went to the polls; 88.5 percent of valid ballots voted the straight ticket. Overall, 7.2 percent cast invalid ballots, and in Havana, 14.3 percent. No deputy received less than 87 percent of the votes. Unofficial sources placed the proportion of invalid ballots in Havana between 10 and 20 percent and the percentage of its residents voting selectively at 30 percent.<sup>39</sup> Officially, about 19 percent of the voters did not vote for the entire slate.<sup>40</sup>

What did the 1992–1993 elections demonstrate? First, in February the Cuban government displayed a certain strength in mobilizing the population, which out of conviction, fear, or a sense of helplessness complied with its demands for a show of unity. The election also revealed a profound weakness: the outcome was gained through mobilizational authoritarianism, a formula that hardly translates into effective, long-term governance. Second, the December outcome was especially telling: when the government did not mount an incessant campaign, up to one-third of the

electorate cast a protest vote. Third, the government's deception regarding the proportion of invalid ballots in December and its "campaign" for the February election confirmed the inability of Cuban leaders to accept an image of less than near-unanimity as a mandate for governance and thus their intractable dependence on mobilizational authoritarianism.

**The Role of the Military** Civil-military relations in Cuba defy simple portrayal. By virtue of its victorious struggle against the Batista dictatorship, the rebel army formed the core of the revolutionary government. National defense against the United States and suppression of domestic opponents soon emerged as the army's cardinal mission. This mission, however, was not just the military's but the *raison d'être* of the social revolution then enveloping Cuban society. The leadership governed with praetorian imperatives that still endure and largely account for its persistent intolerance of civic diversity: only if elites and *el pueblo* rallied behind Fidel Castro, the commander-in-chief, could national sovereignty be preserved and social equality attained. Consequently, tasks normally falling to civilians—agrarian reform in 1959, mobilization of the labor force in the 1960s, reorganization of the state administration in the 1970s, rectification in the 1980s, and the initiation of economic reforms in the 1990s—have depended on the military for their realization. "Civic soldiers" have indeed been integral actors in the mobilizational authoritarianism of Cuban politics.<sup>41</sup>

Unlike the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, where the military was largely under civilian control, the Cuban Communist Party has never clearly established its preeminence. However, the armed forces (FAR) have also not quite dictated civilian politics. The political system has, in fact, often blurred jurisdictional boundaries, even if military intromission in civilian matters has been rather common and the reverse unthinkable.<sup>42</sup> The praetorian framework of Cuban politics has privileged the virtues of military discipline and downplayed the merits of civilian prerogatives, especially if they appeared to threaten the premise of iron-fisted national unity, as did market socialism in the mid 1980s. Moreover, the armed forces are a stronger and more cohesive institution than the PCC. Officers have, for example, maintained a more stable presence in the central committee than party cadres. Though the latter constituted the single largest bloc in the 1997 central committee, they also accounted for thirty of the fifty new members. Well over half the party cadres were dropped; in contrast, almost all officers who were members in 1991 returned in 1997. The oscillations of Cuban state socialism between institutional and mobilizational politics have not reverberated in the armed forces as they have in the Communist party.

In the 1990s two factors have spurred the military's renewed importance: the end of the Angolan war and the collapse of the Communist world. With overseas engagement no longer possible, FAR has turned its sights inwards; with the support network from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe no longer available, economic

development has become a pressing concern for the military.<sup>43</sup> The younger Castro has acknowledged civilian discontent with FAR's high profile: "No one should worry that we *guardias* [guards], as we are commonly known, are involved in all these matters. Before we were *guardias*, we were communists."<sup>44</sup> The military has played an inordinate role in the reconstitution of the political system in at least three ways.

First, early in the decade, when doubts beset many in the population at large and even among the elites about the durability of Cuban socialism, officers joined civilians in affirming a vision of the future without the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. In preparation for the 1991 party congress, Raúl Castro and other senior officers traveled the country, meeting with civilian and military leaders. Their message was simple. "There is a way out. We have answers for the problems that we face." Interestingly, the PCC seemed as prominent as FAR in the initial stages of political regrouping. At the time, the party's ideological secretary, a man with a military background who would be purged in late 1992, was quite actively visiting the provinces. After his demise and with the worsening economic crisis, the military held the political reins more decisively.

Second, after the congress the armed forces minister and other high level military personnel continued to make the national rounds, tending to political and economic matters as well as to their institution's affairs. The visits followed a common pattern. Raúl Castro or his officers visited civilian centers such as factories, schools, and hospitals, inspected the troops, and met with local civilian and military leaders. While civilians of national and local renown always took part in these rounds, the initiative and presence of the military were remarkable. FAR has become an indispensable barometer for the leadership to gauge the country's political mood and to take stock of the economy; the PCC on its own does not appear to be up to the task. Since late 1992 no single civilian party official has stood out the way the former ideological secretary did. The military has also exercised uncommon influence in the already noted rotation of elites, especially that of the provincial PCC secretaries in 1994–1995.

Third, the armed forces have been the motor behind the post-1993 economic reforms. While the military has long participated in the conduct of the economy, the most recent intervention has happened under particularly strenuous circumstances. Never before had the Cuban government faced such a threat of collapse; never before had Cuba confronted such a dire situation without outside support; never before had the leadership been forced to make decisions that so evidently undermined its long-standing commitment to socialism. Under these circumstances the leadership turned first to the armed forces, not the party. Although Fidel Castro remains the visionary of Cuban politics, the military has emerged as its CEO.<sup>45</sup> There is, however, no rift between *el comandante* and the armed forces. When the former momentarily relents on his opposition, the latter advances the reforms with

the expertise of civilian technocrats; when Castro retrenches, the military does so as well. The reopening of the peasant markets in October 1994 is a case in point. In 1981 Raúl Castro and the chiefs of staff wholeheartedly supported their inauguration as part of the modest package of market socialist measures then being implemented. When the elder Castro closed them in 1986, the military moved to the vanguard of rectification. Similarly, in 1990 it went along with the food plan and pushed for the reopening of the markets only after the plan's failure to increase agricultural output was irrefutable. In 1996, when reforms ran against strong political currents, the younger Castro reaffirmed the "correctness" of agricultural markets, while emphasizing the importance of the participation of the state and cooperative sector and criticizing the peasantry for its inability to forge a socialist consciousness.

If one looks at the composition of the party's central committee or the distribution of the state budget, one might easily conclude the political clout of the Cuban military has declined. Officer membership in the central committee declined from 58 percent in 1965 to just under 14 percent in 1991, then rose slightly to 18 percent in 1997. Military expenditures ranged between 8 and 13 percent of the budget during the 1980s, then declined to 6 percent in 1996.<sup>46</sup> However, military shares of central committee slots and state budgets do not accurately measure the praetorian premises upon which Cuban leaders have governed since 1959. Between 1975 and 1985 the government moved toward market socialism. Had it been fully implemented, it might have undermined these premises and bolstered civilian prerogatives. But in 1986 Castro arrested the decade-long movement and reinstated the mobilizational authoritarianism at the heart of Cuban politics. Although the armed forces have always been held up as a model for the rest of society, military virtues have been particularly extolled during the radical experiment of the 1960s and since 1986. In 1994 a general who had just been named transportation minister strongly reacted to the lax discipline he found in the ministry. "Step by step we will have to do what we do in the military."<sup>47</sup> A few months later Raúl Castro echoed a similar sentiment: "FAR is the vanguard of the state."<sup>48</sup>

### **Institutionalism and Mobilizational Authoritarianism**

The series of market reforms launched since 1993 notwithstanding, Cuba can not be said to be on the institutional path of transformation away from old-style state socialism. Mobilizational authoritarianism continues to dominate Cuban politics and to frame the context of economic reforms. As long as it does (and it probably will endure as long as Castro is alive and the United States persists in its present policy), the Cuban Communist Party is unlikely to advance economic restructuring, develop a new kind of public discourse, and establish more normal political links with the population. Instead, mobilizational politics relies on charismatic leadership and radi-

cal nationalism; the armed forces and a politicized (as opposed to technocratic) Communist party constitute its central institutions. In short, reforms as in China and Vietnam perforce dictate a routinized political leadership and a new social contract that mobilizational politics has preempted.

Nonetheless, Cuba is not what it was before 1989. Castro, mobilizational politics, and continued U.S. hostility notwithstanding, the citizenry by its actions and inactions is pushing a reluctant leadership in the direction of economic reforms and is not as available to mobilizational authoritarianism as it once was.<sup>49</sup> Without the Soviet Union, the Cuban state lacks the resources to exert the same degree of tutelage over the economy. In the 1990s legal or illegal private entrepreneurship may well account for up to two-thirds of household consumption. Zig-zagging reforms are marking wide swaths of illegality in society. Surreptitious individuals appear less immediately threatening to mobilizational authoritarianism than the prospect of citizens' pursuing their interests within a gradually emergent legal order of new property relations. Ordinary citizens are also quick to express their views informally and openly in ways they previously did only behind closed doors. Though still small in numbers and under state security's watchful eye, human rights and opposition activists have spawned an incipient network of independent institutions, from professional associations and trade unions to a Web page on the internet. Yet Cuban society thus far gives little evidence of an undercurrent powerful enough to force Fidel Castro to discard mobilizational authoritarianism and embrace a full-fledged reform of Cuban state socialism. The "masses," in rote mass mobilizations at crucial moments or nearly unanimous elections for popular power assemblies, continue to be at the heart of the political system.

One of the strengths of institutionalism lies in the ability of its propositions to trace the interactions leading to the gradual decline of Communist party rule. Similarly, mobilizational authoritarianism may point to a path of political decline in Cuba. Cuban leaders are adamantly determined to avoid what they consider to have been the decisive blunders in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Nicaragua: allowing reformers to fester within the Communist party, launching political and economic reforms simultaneously, calling an election they can not win, and giving the opposition at the elite or popular levels the opportunity to galvanize into action. But by reinforcing the premises of mobilizational politics they themselves may well be blundering.

Mobilizational authoritarianism can not indefinitely sustain the Cuban regime. If nothing else, the certainty of Castro's mortality darkens the horizon; the specter of a popular upheaval or U.S. intervention also looms large in the minds of Cuban leaders. Under the credible mantle of nationalism they have drawn up contingency plans to impose a national emergency government that, if successfully put into effect, would surely deplete their last vestiges of popular goodwill. Moreover, as in the cases of Stalin and Mao, the Communist party seems to lack the institutional where-

withal to “routinize” the authority of Fidel Castro while he is still alive. His passing will likely result in a succession crisis with greater consequences than those of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and China in the 1970s. Cuba does not have the time to establish more normal trappings of state socialism, whether like post-1956 eastern Europe or contemporary China and Vietnam. Although mobilizational authoritarianism has in the short run afforded the Cuban government the resources to reconstitute itself, it may well in the long run chart the path to state socialism’s demise.

What might be some of the consequences of mobilizational authoritarianism in an eventual transition to a market economy and political democracy in Cuba? Countries such as Hungary and Poland, where pragmatic Communist elites engineered significant economic reforms and tolerated relatively strong cultural and political counterelites, have forged more secure democracies and advanced more successful economic transformations.<sup>50</sup> In contrast, economic reforms in Cuba are haphazardly implemented, and organized opposition is allowed no space. Mobilizational authoritarianism may be setting the stage for a more chaotic and savage market transition in Cuba than would more comprehensive reforms. Though the Cuban state can no longer exert the kind of economic control it once did, half-hearted measures are not creating and sustaining new settings where citizens can behave in ways that effect an institutional transformation. Instead, the indecisiveness of the Cuban government is unwittingly encouraging widespread illegalities and corruption that are sure to leave a difficult legacy in a transition to a market economy.

Mobilizational authoritarianism also clouds the future of a democratic Cuba. Under Castro Cuban elites have shown an unyielding determination to defend their power that does not nurture the ambience of compromise imperative for a peaceful transition to and a successful consolidation of democracy. His rule and revolutionary ideology are not a propitious legacy. In addition, the prominence of the military in contemporary Cuba does not portend a smooth passage to the civilian control that is an essential requisite of democracy. With the United States as an antagonist, the Cuban government has successfully appealed to nationalism; in contrast to eastern Europe, therefore, the opposition in Cuba and in exile is deprived of that potent ideology. Nationalism may yet buttress antidemocratic ideologies and movements in a post-Castro, postsocialist Cuba.

Institutionalism provides a solid social scientific framework for the study of state-socialist societies. Yet institutionalism has turned a blind eye to an essential component of politics: elites and ideology. Neglecting them and the institutions that sustain them, particularly when the “master process” is not yet firmly established, may create as serious an analytical problem (if of a different order) as placing them at the core without regard to other factors. Cuba in the 1990s is an important case in point.

## NOTES

I would like to dedicate this article to Andrés Suárez. I thank Julie M. Bunck, Grzegorz Ekiert, Damián Fernández, Jeff Goodwin, Jay Kaplan, Roger Karapin, Tibor Papp, Charles Tilly, the participants in the 1996–1997 seminar on contentious politics at Columbia University, and *Comparative Politics*' anonymous readers for their thoughtful criticisms of this essay.

1. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gyorgy Bence, "Anticipations of the Failure of Communism," and Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, "Why Socialism Failed: Toward a Theory of System Breakdown—Causes of Disintegration of East European State Socialism," *Theory and Society*, 23 (April 1994), 169–210, 211–31.

2. Andrew G. Walder, "The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a Source of Political Decline," in Andrew G. Walder, ed., *The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 3, applied Charles Tilly's phrase to the analysis of state socialism.

3. Linz and Stepan distinguish totalitarianism from posttotalitarianism. The first lacks effective economic, social, or political pluralism; the second allows limited forms of pluralism (though not in politics). Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 40–51.

4. See William S. Turley, "Party, State, and People: Political Structure and Economic Prospects," in William S. Turley and Mark Selden, eds., *Reinventing Vietnamese Socialism: Doi Moi in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 269.

5. The absence of similar social scientific evidence for Cuba is a serious obstacle in applying the institutionalist paradigm and makes it impossible to write an overview of Cuban state socialism akin to Victor Nee and Rebecca Matthews, "Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 22 (1996), 401–35.

6. See János Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

7. Victor Nee and David Stark, eds., *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).

8. See Walder, ed.

9. Susan Eckstein, *Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), though often suggestive, largely interprets Cuban state socialism as if it had.

10. Anna Seleny, "Property Rights and Political Power: The Cumulative Process of Political Change in Hungary," David L. Bartlett, "Losing the Political Initiative: The Impact of Financial Liberalization in Hungary," and David L. Wank, "Bureaucratic Patronage and Private Business: Changing Networks of Power in Urban China," in Walder, ed., pp. 27–60, 114–50, and 153–84; Susan L. Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, "Federalism Chinese Style: The Political Basis of Economic Success in China," *World Politics*, 48 (October 1995), 50–81; Carollee Bengelsdorf, *The Problem of Democracy in Cuba: Between Vision and Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Haroldo Dilla, Gerardo González, and Ana Teresa Vincentelli, *Participación popular y desarrollo en los municipios cubanos* (Havana: Centro de Estudios sobre América, 1993).

11. Though social scientific knowledge of North Korea is scant, a form of mobilizational authoritarianism appears to characterize its political system as well. Charismatic leadership, apparently passed on from Kim Il Sung to his son, Kim Jong Il, a central role for the military, and fear of foreign domination (in this case, by South Korea and Japan) have also been components of North Korean state socialism.

12. For different perspectives, see Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins,*

*Course, and Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

13. The comparison is only political and economic; the radical experiment never perpetrated the barbarism of the Cultural Revolution.

14. *Granma*, Jan. 28, 1991, p. 3; *Granma Weekly Review*, Mar. 25, 1990, pp. 2–3; and *Granma*, Apr. 13, 1990, p. 1.

15. See Víctor Pérez-Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

16. Reuters, Aug. 5, 1995. A year earlier up to 20,000 people flocked to the Malecón upon hearing rumors that ships from Miami were coming to pick up would-be rafters. Though the ships never came, those gathered began to chant antigovernment slogans; it took the government several hours to disperse them.

17. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Latin America—Cuba: Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party*, Oct. 15, 1991, p. 25.

18. Quoted in Phyllis Greene Walker, “The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition,” in Donald E. Schulz, ed., *Cuba and the Future* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 60.

19. *Granma*, Mar. 27, 1996.

20. See Pérez-Stable, pp. 88–89.

21. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Cuba’s Economic Counter Reform (Rectification): Causes, Policies, and Effects,” *Journal of Communist Studies*, 5 (December 1989), 98–137.

22. After three years (1994–96) of modest economic growth, the economy experienced a slowdown. A mounting trade deficit (from \$642 million in 1994 to \$2.2 billion in 1996), a growing foreign debt (\$9.7 billion in late 1994 to \$11 billion in mid 1996), and a ballooning (but not officially specified) internal debt (due to the unprofitable state sector) threaten to reverse the gains since 1993. Lower sugar prices, higher oil prices, and difficulties in obtaining foreign loans to support the harvest completed the dismal economic outlook. *Miami Herald*, Dec. 19, 1996; *El Nuevo Herald*, Apr. 13, 1998.

23. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market?* (Miami: University of Miami North-South Center, 1994); Manuel Pastor, Jr. and Andrew Zimbalist, “Cuba’s Economic Conundrum,” *NACLA: Report on the Americas*, 29 (September–October 1995), 7–12; and Jorge F. Pérez-López, *Cuba’s Second Economy: From behind the Scenes to Center Stage* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995).

24. Associated Press, Sept. 6, 1995.

25. See Carlos Solchaga, “Cuba: Perspectivas económicas,” *Encuentro*, 3 (Winter 1996–1997), 43–53; and Julio Carranza Valdéz, Luis Guitiérrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal González, *Cuba la restructuración de la economía: Una propuesta para el debate* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1995).

26. *Miami Herald*, Apr. 17, 1998, reported legal self-employment at 155,538, down from more than 200,000 in 1996.

27. *The Economist*, Oct. 19, 1996, p. 49. In the late 1980s Cuba’s Gross Social Product (GSP) was about 25 billion pesos a year. Even if \$1 billion have been invested, the sum pales next to the estimated \$5–6 billion a year Cuba received from the Soviet Union in subsidies, credits, and aid.

28. Andrés Oppenheimer, *Castro’s Final Hour: The Secret Story behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

29. Shirk, pp. 33–37; David W. P. Elliot, “Dilemmas of Reform in Vietnam,” in Turley and Selden, eds., pp. 53–94; and Stefan de Vylder, “State and Market in Vietnam,” in Irene Norlund, Carolyn L. Gates, and Vu Cao Dam, eds., *Vietnam in a Changing World* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), pp. 31–70.

30. *Granma*, June 16, 1989, p. 1; June 29, 1989, p. 1; July 14, 1989, p. 1; and July 31, 1989, p. 1; *Granma Weekly Review*, Aug. 20, 1989, p. 3.

31. Pérez-Stable, p. 172.

32. *Juventud Rebelde* (Digital Edition), Oct. 15, 1997.

33. Marifeli Pérez-Stable, “Legislative and Electoral Dynamics,” in *Transition in Cuba* (Cuban

Research Institute and the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University funded by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, 1992-1993), pp. 56-57.

34. *Cuba en el mes* (July 1994), 44-47; (July 1995), 47.
35. *El Nuevo Herald*, Jan. 25, 1995, pp. 1, 4.
36. *Cuba en el mes* (August and September 1994), 20-25 and 42, respectively.
37. *CubaFax Update*, Dec. 31, 1992.
38. Spanish News Agency EFE, Feb. 23, 1993; *Granma*, Feb. 27, 1993.
39. Spanish News Agency EFE, Feb. 23, 1993.
40. The government tallies valid and invalid ballots separately. The percent of invalid ballots is based on the total number of voters.
41. Domínguez, pp. 341-78.
42. Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Cuban Armed Forces, the Party and Society in Wartime and during Rectification (1986-88)," *Journal of Communist Studies*, 5 (December 1989), 45-62.
43. *Cuba en el mes* (December 1991), 30; (May 1992), 33-34; (December 1992), 27; (January 1994), 27; (March 1994), 34-35; (June 1994), 49-51; (November 1994), 64; (January 1995), 60-61; (February 1995), 40-41; (March 1995), 18, 20-24.
44. *Cuba en el mes* (September 1994), 34.
45. Like China's and Vietnam's, Cuba's military is acquiring considerable economic resources. It controls the single most important tourist enterprise, Gaviota Tourism Group, S.A., which in 1994 generated \$220 million, about 15 percent of total export earnings. Phyllis Greene Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," *Cuba Briefing Paper Series*, 12 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, October 1996), 4.
46. Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, pp. 144, 172; Walker, "The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition," p. 60; *Cuba en el mes* (December 1995), 77.
47. *Cuba en el mes* (October 1994), 25.
48. *Cuba en el mes* (April 1995), 44.
49. Damián J. Fernández, "Informal Politics and the Crisis of Cuban Socialism," in Schulz, ed., pp. 69-81; and Eckstein, pp. 119-26. The PCC has alarmingly and critically recognized the emergence of this second society in "El trabajo del Partido en la actual coyuntura," *Granma*, Aug. 15, 1996.
50. Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).